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A NONPARTISAN JUDICIARY.
By Charles Kerr*
When the Judicial.was made one of the co-ordinate branches of
government there was put in motion one of the greatest experiments.
in soverign rule ever at-tempted by any nation. While embodying
many of the English characteristics, our judiciary may not be accepted as a duplicate of the English system. Under a form of government where there exists no written charter, and the will of
parliament is supreme, there could of necessity be no system of
judicature that might bear towards our systems. complex thougb.
they may be, anything more than a few general characteristics.
Under our system an act of congress may be annulled because it
is unconstitutional, but under the English system the courts themselves are the subject of legislative control. The Federal system
as administered in this country, is a creature of our Constitution.
Congress may prescribe the mode of procedure, but congress cannot abolish the system. True it may be that the judicial is the
weakest of the three branches, but it has a distinct and independent
entity which neither the executive nor the legislative can destroy.
The time was when thQre existed among certain schools of construetionists a feeling that the judiciary could be held under subjection
to thee legislative, and even the executive, but Chief Justice Marshall
forever dissipated that heresy, and gave to the judicial an independent and dignified status.
The Federal system followed the English form of organization
in that the judges are appointive, and hold their office for life or
good behavior. The Thirteen Colonies, which took a formative part;
in the constitutional fabric, have clung to the appointive rather
than the elective system in the organization of their state tribunals,
believing that better results would follow a selective rather than an
elective course, though there existed no uniformity in the manner
and method of appointment. Virginia, North Carolina, Soutb
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Carolina and New Jersey, under their first .constitutions, gave to
their respective legislatures the power of appointment, or election; Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and
Maryland gave that power to the governor, while Georgia alone
granted that power to the people.
When the tide of democracy began to run strong between 1812
and 1860, a period of something like a half century, several of the
states either adopted new constitutions or so amended the existing
ones, that the election of judges was given to the people voting at
the polls in popular contest. Practically all of the new states admitted during this period, as well as those that have sin.-e been
admitted, adopted the general election system, so that, at the present time nearly all the western and southern states, besides New
York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, have the elective system. Not to exceed twelve states have retained the form of appointment by the
governor, subject to confirmation by the senate, or election by the
state legislatures, or one house thereof.
Admittedly the least desirable of all the methods is the elective.
By natural intendment the elective system throws the result into
.a political contest. If one of the contestants should be opposed to
:free trade and the other favored it; if one believed in free silver
and the other the gold standard, irrespective of their legal attainments, they would receive the vote of their respective parties, their
election depending not on their fitness for the position, but their
adherence to the tenets of a particular political organization.
Kentucky was one of the states vhich first adopted the appointive system,, and that was the rule in Kentucky until the adoption
of the Constitution of 1849. Under the first court system in Kentucky the circuit judges were appointed from the state at large, and
held court in the several districts, and it may be said that in many
respects it was a system that had much to commend it. Certainly
the bench of the state has never been so free from local environment, or so independent, as it was during the period between the
first and second Constitutions-1792 to 1799.
The debates in the convention of 1849, when the appointive
system was substituted for the elective, are both instructive and
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entertaining. There were in that body not a few delegates who
fought to the last what they considered so grave an innovation.
The question of partisanship found but few who expressed any
concern on that subject, the main point of discussion being the destruction of the independence of the judiciary through causes other
than political. One member proposed that a judge should be liable
to impeachment if he "treated," electioneered, made speeches, or
otherwise bestirred himself in seeking popular favor. Another proposed that the judges should be ineligible for re-election. On this
point one member went so far as to say that Pontius Pilate would
not have told the Savior he had power over life and death if he had
been ineligible for reappointment. The result of the long debates
was the erection of a system quite in keeping with that which exists today.
The wisdom of those who opposed the present system is, to
many, daily becoming more apparent. The elective mode being a
constitutional provision, however, there is no remedy save in a constitutional amendment. There are few who will give unqualified
adherence to the present method of selecting our judges, though
they may express a preference for the present system over the appointive. The convention of 1891 made very few ehanges from the
system established by the convention of 1849, and such changes as it
did make are for the worse. The last was essentially a populistic
assembly, though it had among its members some of the ablest men
in the state. Its greatest weakness consisted in the fact that the
delegates which composed it did not recognize the distinction
which existed between organic and statutory law, and for that reason undertook to legislate for all time, believing that with them
all wisdom would die.
But with all its legislating it left enough to the legislature to
make the judiciary as partisan as it could well be made. We have
now in Kentucky an election law which makes it compulsory upon
any candidate for office to have been a member of some political
party for a certain time before his name can be placed upon the
ballot, whether in the primary or general election. One seeking
the office of judge must, therefore, declare his partisanship before
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he can become a candidate. If the district be Republican the judge
will be a Republican, if it be Democratic the judge will be a Democrat. As partisans two contending candidates in the general election must have their names placed before the voters of their district. What the framers of the Constitution of 1849 conceived to
be the one thing that would destroy the independence of the judiciary has now been enacted into an obligatory election statute. The
repudiation of this law, and the enactment of a statute that will
take the judiciary entirely out of politics, is a matter that has begun to attract the attention of the better thinking class in each
party.
That the judiciary should be as free from partisan bias, and
party obligation, as it is possible to render it, is not a subject about
which there need be any serious discussion. Certainly the subject
itself should not be a partisan one. Recognized to be a handicap,
and by none more than the judges themselves, there appears no
good or sufficient reason why the lawmakers of both parties should
not approach the subject with a sincere purpose on the part of
each one to enact such legislation as will, measurably, at least, cure
the ill that all deplore.
A lawyer taken from the bar and lifted to the bench does not
pass through that transformation that was experienced by Elijah
and Enoch. However much one clothed with judicial authority
may desire to do equal and exact justice to all, if he be a just and
honest man with himself, he is ever conscious of the fact that he is
a human being, beset by all the weaknesses of character and purpose that contended with him for the mastery before his judicial
translation. Since the establishment of the judiciary system of
Moses, down through the Greek and Roman periods, and thence
through all the varying processes that have accompanied the English system of judicature, men have recognized the necessity for
removing the judges as far from the influences of environment as
conditions made possible. Perfection in this regard has not been
found, and never will be, but much can be done that will tend, at
least, to the creation of a less dependent relationship between the
judiciary and the citizenry through whose franchise the individual
judge receives his commission.
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What can be done in Kentucky, under our present Constitution,
to create a nonpartisan judiciary is a subject that will, in all
probability, engage the attention of our General Assembly.
Politically the circuit judges in Kentucky are about equally divided between the two dominant parties. The Legislature itself
is very nearly equally divided. A more propitious time,.therefore
could not be found for the consideration of this subject.
Many of the states where the elective system prevails have
already taken steps towards a general reformation. In some of the
states there has been an entirely new order created, much after the
proposals of the member from Henry county in the, convention of
1849, who, as before mentioned, wanted a provision in the Constitution that would render a judge liable to impeachment who
treated the voters, made public speeches in his own behalf, or used
any inducements to secure a vote. To secure the results desired
there would of necessity have to be a radical change in the present
election laws. This, however, need cause no anxiety as the entire
election laws have little to commend them to public favor. At best
an agglomeration of inconsistent and contradictory provisions, enacted from time to time to suit the exigencies of occasion, the entire statutory collection might be repealed with credit to the state,
and thus clear the way to a much simpler and more commendable
order of procedure.
Some of the provisions of the present Constituti6n will not
materially assist in securing some of the reforms that have been
suggested by some of the bar associations of the various counties.
The term is fixed at six years, and the pay limited to a maximum
of 4. /%. The Legislature has never yet advanced the pay of
circuit judges to that amount. Fixed for many years at $3,000,
this salary, by a questionable device, was increased to $4,200.
Judges in courts having continuous sessions have had the difference between $3,000 and the maximum of $5,000 supplied by the
fiscal courts of their respective- counties. The one material reform
which the Legislature can create, however, is the enactment of a
law which will compel the election of circuit judges and judges of
the Court of Appeals, in particular, on a nonpartisan ticket. Rather
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than have the candidate declare his partisanship in advance should
there be enacted a law which will provide that candidates for the
position of judge shall run upon a ticket which will contain no
party emblem, and in seeking the office there should also be some
stringent provision to the effect that no candidate shall resort to
any of the usual methods of the candidate to secure his,election,
either through his own or the efforts of his friends. By such a
method the successful candidate, under a popular election system,
will be as nearly removed from partisan obligation as it is possible
to accomplish. No one expects a judge, merely because he is a
judge, to lose his identity as a citizen, or to express his views on
questions which concern the public. The bench is not a cloister.
The judge remains a citizen, and retains a citizen's interest in the
public weal, and is generally compelled to express his convictions
through a partisan ballot, but that is a far different matter from
the partisanship of a party contest for election to the office.
The legislature cannot extend the time, as has been suggested.
It cannot increase the salary beyond the constitutional maximum.
It cannot change the constitutional qualifications. TMany of the
changes which experience would suggest will be barred by the constitutional barrier, but there is no provision of the Constitution
which will prevent a change in the mode of election from a partisan
to a nonpartisan method. A judge, more than any public official,
ought to be free from party bias or personal obligation. No one
appreciates this fact more than the judges themselves, and no one
desires such freedom more than they.
The Constitution requires that all circuit judges shall be elected
at stated times. The next general election will be in 1921. Unless
the approaching legislature provides for a nonpartisan judiciary
form of election it will be eight years before such a system can be
put into effect. The necessity, therefore, for action, if action is
to be had, by the present General Assembly, is most apparent. The
enactment of such a law should engage the bast thtught of both parties, and whatever law may be passed should be passed in a nonpartisan spirit. As one who has had the experience of having been
appointed by the governor, as having been elected without opposi-
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tion, and as having been elected after a spirited contest of good
will and good feeling on the part of a generous opponent, there
exists a settled conviction that a nonpartisan judiciary system of
election is the only remedy that suggests itself as a near approach
to the end desired.

